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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Paul Bairas,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.
Lanard Johnson and Norman Cram,
co-administrators of the estate of
Philip G. Fulstow, deceased,
Defendants-Respondents

No. 9599

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries by the plaintiff,
and personal injuries and property damage by the
defendant, arising out of a one car accident.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Because of injuries sustained in the accident, plaintiff was unable to attend the jury trial setting of
September 20, 1961. The court refused plaintiff's motion
for a continuance and, since the plaintiff was unable to
proceed, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint
with prejudice and defendants' counterclaim without
prejudice.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal or vacation of the judgment
below and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about July 5, 1960, plaintiff, Paul Bairas, a
resident of Los Angeles County, California, and Dr.
Philip G. Fulstow of Kanab, Utah, were involved in
a one car accident in Coconino County, Arizona, in
which Dr. Fulstow was killed and plaintiff suffered a
broken neck causing him to be paralyzed from about
the neck down ( R. 7, 8, 18) . Plaintiff was removed
to California where at the times pertinent hereto he
was a ward of the County of Los Angeles, State of
California, having no resources of his own ( R. 18, 41,
110).
Plaintiff Bairas filed this suit against the defendants,
co-administrators of Dr. Fulstow's estate, on March 9,
1961 (R. 3). In his complaint plaintiff alleged that
Dr. Fulstow was operating the automobile at the time
of the accident and further that the negligence, carelessness, recklessness and intoxication on the part of
Fulstow caused the accident (R. 1-2). The defendants'
answer and counterclaim was served on March 27, 1961.
Defendants denied the essential allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and in their counterclaim alleged that
plaintiff was the driver of the automobile and at fault
(R. 7, 8).
Fifteen days later the defendants applied to the
court to set the case for trial ( R. 20) . Accordingly the
case was set for June 14, 1961, but at the request of
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counsel for the plaintiff that date was changed to June
28, 1961, because the prior date conflicted with a
planned trip of counsel ( R. 20, 21).
A week before the date set for trial, counsel for the
plaintiff informed the court that a motion for continuance on the ground that the plaintiff was unable
to travel to Utah would be made ( R. 24) . This motion
was supported by an affidavit of counsel for the plaintiff
(R. 12) and an affidavit of Dr. C. H. Imes, a member
of the medical staff of the Rancho Los Amigos Hospital
in Los Angeles County for the treatment of paraplegic
patients ( R. 18) . Defendants filed a four page affidavit
in opposition to the motion for continuance, outlining
their opposition to the motion ( R. 20-23). At the hearing the defendants strongly opposed the granting of the
motion for continuance unless it be agreed and ordered
that there be no further continuances and that if the
plaintiff should be unable to attend the next setting of
the trial his deposition would be taken and used and
further that the plaintiff would give defendants ten
days notice of the taking of the deposition should it
appear that plaintiff would be unable to attend (R. 2729). An order to this effect was signed by the court
and served by defendants upon the plaintiff (R. 30).
By this order which expressed that "the terms and conditions were stipulated to by counsel for the Plaintiff
in consideration for the court granting the instant continuance,'' the case was set for trial on September 20,
1961.
It appears from the affidavit of the plaintiff that
six days before the September trial date he was informed
3
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by the hospital doctors that he would not be able to
travel to Utah for trial, although previous to this notification plans and arrangements had been made for his
travel to and stay in Utah for the trial (R. 109, 110).
From the affidavit of Nathan Goller, plaintiff's Los
Angeles attorney, it appears that when he contacted
plaintiff on September 11, 1961, it was then intended
and planned for plaintiff to travel to Utah for trial and
that reservations on the Union Pacific Railroad had
been made for that purpose ( R. 113) . At the time plaintiff was informed that he would not be allowed to
travel to Utah he was also informed that a trans-uretha
section operation had been scheduled for September 21
in order that he might more comfortably and without
attendance relieve his bladder (R. 110). It appears that
plaintiff attempted immediately to contact Mr. Goller
but that since he was paralyzed from the neck down
and could neither write or phone he had to request
others to do this for him ( R. 113 ) . He was first able
to notify Mr. Goller of these unforseen and unexpected
developments Sunday, September 17 (R. 110, 113). Mr.
Goller attempted to obtain permission from the hospital
for plaintiff's trip but was unsuccessful (R. 113). It
was further shown by Mr. Goller's affidavit that he at
all times until September 17 believed that the plaintiff
\vould be able to travel to Utah for the trial of his
case ( R. 114) .
Mr. Goller notified the trial judge by wire September
18 (R. 51). Affidavits of Dr. C. H. Imes of the hospital
staff and Mr. Goller were executed September 18 and
filed with the court September 20 (R. 42, 44~ 50).
4
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Plaintiff's local counsel were notified by September 18
and they notified, as quickly as possible, the court and
defendants' counsel ( R. 100). When the case was called
on September 20 plaintiff made an oral motion for a
continuance based on the inability of the plaintiff to
attend ( R. 61).
Plaintiff also made a motion for a change of venue
which had been served previously by mail (R. 34, 35)
and in support thereof were filed an affidavit and a
petition signed by twenty eight local residents (R. 32,

36).
Concerning the motion for contin·uance, the plaintiff
argued inter alia, at the hearing on the 20th, that this
was the first opportunity to bring the matter before
court or defendants' counsel; that plaintiff was a welfare
patient in a Los Angeles County hospital for paraplegics
and as such was subject to the control of the hospital
authorities; that unforseen circumstances arose very
rapidly; that it was believed that the plaintiff would
be able to attend trial on the date set until the Monday
prior to the Wednesday on which the trial was set; that
the agreement and order of the court of June 26 should
not operate to deprive the plaintiff of a fair opportunity
to try his case; that he is a material witness and that
his presence is necessary to the proper conduct of his
case; that it was impossible to comply in detail with
the provisions of rule 6 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure because of the shortness of time and because
affidavits from California did not arrive until the evening
of the day prior to the trial setting; and that the June 26
understanding and order should not prejudice the right of

5
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the plaintiff to a fair trial in light of the unforseen and
unexpected circumstances which arose (R. 55, 57, 59,
66, 71).
In opposition to the motion defendants argued that
it was not timely filed and served and therefore could
not be heard; that the order and agreement of June 26
precluded consideration of a continuance and that the
trial must go on; that plaintiff should have anticipated
that he might not be able to be present for the trial
of his case and should have been prepared by desposition;
that the affidavits were not sufficiently specific; and
defendants also incorporated all objections made at the
time of the June 26 hearing (R. 53, 59, 67, 69, 70).
The court denied the motion for continuance on the
ground that "it is an oral motion, not having, of course,
been served upon defendants as is contemplated and
required under the Rules of Civil Procedure and it
appearing to the court in this cause that the reasons
set out for the continuance are not sufficient to justify
a continuance at this time . . . '' (R. 73). The motion
for a change of venue was also denied (R. 73).
Accordingly, the trial proceeded without the presence
of the plaintiff, the jury being empaneled on the afternoon of September 20 ( R. 79). Plaintiff's counsel
attempted a proffer of proof as to what the plaintiff
would testify to were he present ( R. 77, 78) and it
appears that the court agreed to the preparation and
filing of a written proffer of proof (see R. 78) which
proffer was prepared and filed ( R. 124) .
A later renewal of the motion for continuance was
also denied by the court ( R. 82) . Plaintiff then attempted
6
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to introduce into evidence in its entirety a discovery
deposition taken by defendants of plaintiff at an earlier
date (R. 86) but upon objection to this by defendants,
the offer was \vithdra\vn and the deposition \vas not
introduced in evidence in whole or in part (R. 87, 88).
Plaintiff's counsel then indicated that they could go
no further ( R. 91 ) whereupon the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice and the defendants' counterclaim without prejudice (R. 91).
Plaintiff made a timely motion for a new trial based,
inter alia, upon the denial of the motion for continuance
and the denial of the motion for change of venue ( R.
99-103 ) . At the time this motion was heard, the court
had before it the affidavit of Paul Bairas, plaintiff,
setting forth that he had believed he would have been
able to attend the trial September 20 until notified to
the contrary a few days prior thereto; that his condition
was one of improvement; that transportation and attendance arrangements had previously been made; that a
week before trial he was notified that his condition
would not allow him to go and that the hospital had
scheduled a trans-uretha section for September 21, 1961,
which would, if successful, allow him to release his
bladder without the use of a catheter; that he had no
resources of his own and was dependent for medical
care and subsistence on the County of Los Angeles and
therefore was under their control and jurisdiction; that
he had been advised that he would be released in about
four weeks and that the county would provide him with
money for a medical attendant to assist him outside
of the hospital but that so long as he was a full time
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patient of the hospital they would not provide him
with a full time assistant for travel away from the
hospital (R. 109-111).
In addition, the court also had before it two additional affidavits of Nathan Goller, plaintiff's Los Angeles
counsel (R. 113, 117), an affidavit of Dr. Edward Bobo
of the Rancho Los Amigos Hospital in Los Angeles
County (R. 115), an affidavit of Dr .C. H. Imes, also
of the Rancho Los Arnigos Hospital in Los Angeles
County ( R. 119) and the written proffer of what the
plaintiff would have testified to had he been able so
to do (R. 124).
The motion for a new trial was denied and an
amended judgment was entered on October 26, 1961
( R. 122, 128) .
A total of seven months and seventeen days had
elapsed since the filing of the complaint.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, BOTH
AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL AND AT THE
TIME OF THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL,
IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A
CONTINUANCE WHICH WAS MADE ON THE
GROUND THAT HIS SERIOUS ILLNESS AND
PARALYSIS ARISING OUT OF THE ACCIDENT IN ISSUE PREVENTED HIS BEING IN
ATTENDANCE AT TRIAL ON THE DATE SET.
In order to fully understand the speed with which
the plaintiff was denied his day in court, the material
8
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prejudice arising therefrom and the reasons \vhy the
continuance should have been granted, it may be of
va luc to the court to review some of facts as they
happened.
rfhis case arose out of a one car accident. There
is a dispute as to whether the plaintiff or Dr. Fulstow
\vas the driver. In fact, all material points are in issue.
Only the plaintiff and Dr. Fulstow were in the car at
the time of the accident. Dr. Fulstow was killed. The
plaintiffs neck was broken resulting in paralysis from
about the neck down. Being without resources of his
O\vn, he was made a ward of the County of Los Angeles
in a hospital for paraplegics and he was subject to
the control and jurisdiction of the hospital.
This suit was filed on March 9, 1961. Defendants
answer and counterclaim was served on March 27, 1961.
Only fifteen days thereafter defendants applied to
the court for a trial setting. Trial was first set for June
14 but was reset for June 28 because the first date
conflicted \vith a planned trip of plaintiff's counsel.
Plaintiff had not been consulted concerning the first
setting.
Prior to June 28, plaintiff moved for a continuance
on the ground that he was not then physically able
to be present at his trial. Defendants vigorously opposed
this continuance although only a few days more than
three rnonths had elapsed since the filing of the complaint and no pretrial procedure had been invoked. At
this time it was the opinion of plaintiff's doctor that
the plaintiff should be able to attend in about three
months.

9
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Over the defendants' vigorous objection the court
granted a continuance to September 20, but at the
insistence of defendants, and apparently as consideration
for the continuance, the court required an agreementembodied in its "Order Continuing Trial Date" (R. 30)
-to the effect that this would be the last continuance,
that if plaintiff were not able to attend his deposition
would be used, and, in addition, that if it were to appear
that it would be necessary to use plaintiff's deposition
that the defendants be given at least ten days notice
of the taking of the deposition.
Plaintiff, however, continued to show steady improvement and he and his Los Angeles counsel, Mr.
Nathan Goller, made the necessary arrangements, including train reservations, for his trip to Utah for the
trial.
Unexpectedly, on September 14, six days before the
trial date, plaintiff was for the first time informed by
the hospital that he could not attend the trial and
further that his then condition required a trans-uretha
section on September 21 for the purpose of enabling
him to release his bladder without the use of a catheter
and without the constant surveillance of attendants, and
that this operation would, if successful, greatly facilitate
his ability to travel. Because of his paralysis from the
neck down, plaintiff was required to rely upon others
to notify his counsel of this unexpected development.
He was first able to notify Mr. Goller on September 17,
and he, Mr. Goller, immediately attempted to get the
hospital authorities to reverse their position and to allow
the plaintiff to travel to Utah, but in this he \vas un-
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successful. Mr. Goller immediately notified the court of
this development. Counsel were notified as rapidly as
possible. Affidavits stating the facts were prepared,
forwarded to Utah, and an oral motion for a continuance was made in court on the morning of the
20th.
Defendants again vigorously opposed the granting
of the motion, on the ground, inter alia, that it had
not been timely filed. Defendants also insisted that the
court's order of June 26 precluded any further continuance and that the plaintiff should have been prepared
for this type of unforseen development. Defendants insisted that the trial proceed. This was six months and
eleven days after the initial commencement of this suit.
The trial court denied plaintiff's motion even though
the affidavit of Dr. Imes of the Rancho Los Amigos
Hospital showed that a trip at that time would seriously
endanger plaintiff's life, but that the contemplated
operation would greatly facilitate plaintiff's traveling to
Utah, and that the plaintiff should be able to accomplish
this travel in about five weeks \lvith the hospital furnishing him needed assistance for this purpose ( R. 41 ) .
Though the case had been at issue for less than six
months, the requested short continuance was denied.
Rule 40 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that "Upon motion of a party, the court may
in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just
. . . postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
sho\vn." Plaintiff recognizes the wholesome rule that
the granting of a continuance is within the sound
11
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discretion of the trial court and that the court's action
will be reviewed only where there is an abuse of this
sound discretion.
Plaintiff submits that this is a case meriting such
review. Plaintiff recognizes that there are many cases
which on their facts have held that failure to grant a
continuance was not error. Plaintiff also recognizes that
where, in fairness and in the furtherance of the ends
of justice, a continuance should have been granted in
a given case, the appellate courts have not hesitated
to grant relief in order that a party may have his day
in court.
Plaintiff submits that this is a case meriting such
review in order that the mandate contained in the
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, that "All courts
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay ... " and the further
mandate contained in Rule 1 (a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure promulgated by this court, that "They
shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action" shall
not be mere hollow utterances honored more in the
breach than in the observance. (Italics added)
Surely the right to a just trial on the merits must
take precedence over the right to a speedy disposition
of a case not on the merits \vhich precludes a plaintiff
paralyzed from the neck do,vn from ever having heard
in a court of justice his cause which had then been
but a fe,v days over six months on the docket.

12
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It has been recognnized in many cases that a party
has a strong and substantial right to attend the trial
of his own case in order to assist his council in its
conduct (as well as be a material \vitness). He should
not be denied this fundamental right for light and transient reasons or merely as a matter of convenience to
court or counsel or as a matter of technicality, when
to do so deprives him forever of the right to have his
case heard on the merits.
In Jaffe v. Lilienthal, 101 Cal. 175, 35 P. 636, 637
( 1894) the court said
It seldom happens that a trial can be properly
had in the absence of the plaintiff, even where he
is disqualified as a witness, especially where it is
to be tried upon oral testimony. With all the care
that can reasonably be taken by both attorney
and client, some matter of vital importance is
liable to be overlooked by them until the trial
calls it to the recollection of the plaintiff, and this
is especially true in relation to matters purely in
rebuttal. It is the right of parties to be present
at the trial of their causes.
The recent case of Giorgetti v.
241 P. 2d 199 ( 1952), quoting the
held it an abuse of discretion to
\vhere illness precluded a party's

Peccole, 69 Nev. 76,
above with approval,
deny a continuance
attendance.

In the leading case of Borman v. Geib, 94 Okla. 270,
221 P. 1006, 1007 ( 1924) the Oklahoma court held
A party to the litigation is entitled to be present
to assist in the conduct of the cause. Counsel is
entitled to have his client present for many considerations which need not be detailed here, but
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which are familiar to all courts and legal practitioners.
Other significant cases in support of this fair and
fundamental rule are Westfall v. Motors Ins. Corp., 348
P. 2d 784 (Mont. 1960); Anderson v. Chapman, 356
P. 2d 1072 (Okla. 1960); Rausch v. Cozian, 86 Colo.
389, 282 P. 251 (1929); Bernard's Fur Shop v. De Witt,
Inc., 102 A2d 462 (Mun.Ct.App., Dist. Col. 1954);
Norman v. McGraw, 299 P.2d 521 (Okla. 1956).
The older Utah case of McGrath v. Tallent, 7 Utah
256, 26 P. 574 ( 1891) cannot be considered as diminishing that rule for the comments there concerning continuance are not essential to the disposition of the case
for it was disposed of on other grounds.
In any event, plaintiff was a material witness and
thus would come within the rule stated, through dicta, in
McGrath. Not only was a proper showing of the materiality of plaintiff's testimony made-we do not believe
this point to be seriously questioned-but it should have
been, and undoubtedly was, apparent to the court from
the very nature of the case. Morehouse, v. Morehouse,
136 Cal. 332, 68 P. 976 (1902).
We recognize that where there is no chance for
improvement the court may properly deny a continuance,
in a proper case, rather than merely postpone the inevitable. But where there is a reasonable chance for
improvement and attendance, as there was in this case,
it has been almost universally held error to deny on this
ground a motion for continuance. A recent case in point
is Thanos v. Mitchell, 220 Md. 389, 152 A.2d 833
( 1959). Despite dilatory delays for over two years the
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court held it error to deny a continuance, pointing out,
at page 834, that
It appeared that Mrs. Thanos would be available
within a reasonable time (a different situation
would be presented if her illness were permanent
or the prognosis was for a lengthy disability). As
Judge Henderson said in Plank v. Summers [205
Md. 598, 109 A.2d 914, 917] to have required
the case to go to trial without her presence, would
have been "like the play of Hamlet with Hamlet
left out.''
Plaintiff finds no error in the many cases which hold
~hat a continuance need not be granted, on the basis
of illness, where there is no possibility of recovery sufficient to allow attendance within a reasonable time.
But that is not the instant case. The affidavits of the
plaintiff and his doctors show continual improvement,
interrupted once temporarily, but eventually hastening
recovery, by the situation which prevented his appearance
at the September trial date. It would be indeed most
unjust and restrictive to the point of being a denial of
due process if the procedural rules were to deprive the
plaintiff of an opportunity to show this court, or a
trial court, as the case might be, that in fact the belief
of himself and others that his rate of recovery would
have allowed attendance in about five weeks was not
only bona fide but also accurate. The plaintiff would
'velcome an opportunity to show the truth of the above
statement and that he is, and for some time has been
-as was presented to the trial court would be the
case-able, ready and willing to travel to Utah for the
trial of his case.
15
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rfhere had been no undue delay in the prosecution
of this case; on the other hand, there was a most concerted effort on the part of defendants to avoid a trial
on the merits, an effort which, it might be said, went
to the extreme of taking an unfair advantage of plaintiff's helpless condition at a time when about five more
\Veeks would have allowed a fair trial on the merits.
At the risk of being repetitive, plaintiff would again
point out to the court that this case was filed on
March 9, 1961 and ended by the denial of plaintiff's
motion on September 21, a period of only six months
and twelve days. Had the reasonable continuance requested been granted, the matter could have been heard
on its merits in about eight months or less from the
date the complaint was first filed. It may be noted that
except for the factors arising in a wrongful death action
or a claim against an estate, the plaintiff would have
had, in a normal situation, until the middle of 1964
in which to have filed his suit-and the defendants would
not have been heard to complain.
No case has been found, similar to the present case
on its facts, wherein speed has been held so much more
important than a just trial on the merits that a denial
of a continuance has been affirmed. This fundamental
principal of Anglo-American due process and fair play
is quite well summed up in a few words in Borman v.
Geib, 94 Okla. 270, 221 P. 1006, 1007 ( 1924) where
the court said
The showing made disclosed that the plaintiff
could be present within a reasonable time. Justice
does not demand that a trial should be so hurried
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that a plaintiff who is absent on account of illness
is deprived of the right to be present.
There are many cases which have held, despite great
delays, prior continuances, dilatory tactics and other
misconduct that a denial of a continuance where a party
was ill was error. Despite many apparently prior delays
on flimsy excuses, the court held in Anderson v. Chapman,
356 P.2d 1072 (Okla. 1960) that a refusal of a continuance requested because of party's illness was reversible error. In that case the period of total delay
\vas sixteen months. Where a fair trial on the merits
will be facilitated thereby, a continuance should be
granted on the basis of a party's illness, despite prior
continuances and delays. Morehouse v. Morehouse, 136
Cal. 332, 68 P. 976 (1902) several prior continuances;
Pierce v. Merchants Heat & Light Co., 189 Ind. 571,
127 N.E. 765, 128 N.E. 598 ( 1920) much procrastination
and delay; Overstreet v. Citizens' Union Nat. Bank, 256
Ky. 653, 76 S.W.2d 641 (1934) attorney-party guilty
of dilatory tactics prior to illness; Ex parte Driver, 258
Ala. 233, 62 So.2d 241 ( 1952) two prior continuances.
Some cases have turned on the question of whether
the alleged illness did in fact prevent attendance or was
merely advanced as an excuse. Defendants have not seen
fit to question the fact of illness, or incapacity, in this
case, nor is that point seriously in issue. Defendants have
asserted, however, that the agreement and order of June
26 precluded a further continuance regardless of the
question of good faith or when the plaintiff first learned
that the hospital would not allow him to attend the trial.
Plaintiff submits, however, that the agreement and order
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must be read as a whole and that the third portionwhich would be superfluous if it did not have this effect
-shows that the order was not an absolute do or die
matter, but that it was reasonably and in good faith
interpreted by plaintiff and his counsel not to preclude
a request for a further continuance if the plaintiff, unexpectedly, were unable to attend the trial from matters
arising to late to give the required ten days notice for
the taking of his deposition.
'"fhis provision which was inserted at the insistence
of defendants and apparently prepared in its final form
by defendants should not be held to make a game of
Russian Roulette out of our trial procedure and to
deprive a plaintiff of his day in court because of the
sudden arising of an unexpected impediment to his
attendance and participation at trial. If however this
court should feel that such was the intention of the
court's order of June 26, it is submitted that this court,
in the exercise of its equitable supervisory powers over
the administration of justice in this state can and should
act to relieve plaintiff from the harshness of the bargain
exacted as the quid pro quo for the first continuanc~
requested because of his illness. Such action by this court
would serve to make the order of June 26, authorized
by U. R. C. P. 40(b) just rather than an unjust order.
Such action would also be consistent with the letter and
the spirit of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
Defendants also asserted at trial that the plaintiff
should not have his continuance because he should have
been prepared for such an eventuality as did occur and
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have available plainntiff's deposition. Under other circumstancess this might be a wholesome rule. Such
circumstances would be where there was little chance
for ultimate recovery, where there had been several
prior delays, where there had been long prior delays
or where the plaintiff had not been acting in good faith.
While there are many cases which could be indiscriminately cited for the proposition that a party will not be
granted a continuance where he could have taken his
deposition, such cases do not bear scrutiny on this point.
Approximately forty of these cases are collected at 68
A.L.R.2d 470, 482. As is always the case when using
secondary sources, the cases cited must be examined with
caution. Almost all of them have been examined and
in those instances where a denial of a continuance based
on illness of a party has been upheld there have been,
almost invariably, other substantial and good reasons,
completely independent of the deposition question, to
merit the denial. In some there were very lengthy prior
delays; in some the assertion of illness was clearly a
fabrication; in some the ill party had no prospect of
recovery; some suggested that there was no showing
of materiality to the party's testimony; in others the
party's testimony was available from a prior trial of
the same case; in some there is obvious bad faith; and
in some the opinion is so truncated and devoid of essential
facts as to be meaningless as a judicial pronouncement.
The better reasoned cases however which are similar
in background to the instant case hold it error to require
a party-witness to submit to a trial by deposition where
a showing is made that a reasonable further delay would
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allow him to attend and to testify in person. For example,
in Sampley v. Sampley, 166 S.W.2nd 208 (Tex.Civ.App.
194 2 ) the court said, at page 209,
The appellee's sole answer to the application
for continuance, on the merits, was that he,
through his counsel following the first continuance,
offered to aid appellant's counsel in procuring her
deposition by waiving time, commission, etc., so
that she might in that way get her testimony into
the cause before another trial; but it is this court's
conclusion that she was not compelled-at her
peril-to content herself with a deposition in
advance of and in anticipation of being unable
to appear at some future date. . .
Of similar import are Stoneberger v. Bishkin, 236
S.W. 782 (Tex.Civ.App. 1922); Low, Hudson & Gray
Water Co. v. Hickson, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 457, 74 S.W.
781 ( 1903). See also Plank v. Summers, 205 Md. 598,
109 A.2d 914, 917 ( 1954).
In some cases prejudice to the opposing side has
been a factor considered. The record in this case is
devoid of any evidence to suggest that the defendants
would be prejudiced or even materially inconvienced by
the granting of the requested postponement. At the June
26 hearing reference by affidavit was made to the desire
to close the estate to avoid tax penalties and that the
heirs were suffering anxiety, solicitude and concern over
the litigation and that the settlement of the claims of
general creditors was being delayed. However no facts
in support of these broad, general, sweeping conclusions
were adduced at that time, nor has this ground been
seriously interposed since or substantiated. It is unfortunate that litigation cannot be conducted without
20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

some inconvenience-but such seems to be the nature of
the thing and it is respectfully submitted that in order
to justify depriving a party of a chance to prove the
merits of his claim the inconvenience that would deprive
a man forever of his day in court must be indeed more
than mere conjecture. Any inconvenience caused by the
short requested delay would have been microscopically
infinitesimal compared to the enormity and gravity of
the loss to the plaintiff.
The facts and showings concerning the reason for
plaintiffs requested continuance were all before the trial
court at the time the motion was denied on September
20. They were still before the court, and amplified and
buttressed by additional affidavits at the time of the
hearing on the motion for a new trial. At either point
the trial court could have, and should have, granted
the continuance. The arguments made herein are applicable to either point of time.
It is respectfully submitted that under the circumstances of this case it was material prejudicial erroran abuse of the trial court's sound discretion-to deny
plaintiff's requested continuance and that accordingly
the judgment below should be reversed or vacated and
a new trial granted.

POINT 2 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A CHANGE
OF VENUE.
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 78-13-9 provides:
The court may, on motion, change the place of
trial in the following cases:
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( 2) When there is reason to believe that an
impartial trial cannot be had in the county, city,
or precinct designated in the complaint.
Plaintiff moved the court for a change of venue on
the ground that local prejudice would preclude his obtaining a fair trial in the county where set. In support
thereof plaintiff provided the court with an affidavit
of Larry Reeves and a petition signed by twenty-eight
persons all to the effect that there was such bias and
prejudice in Kane County as to make it impossible for
plaintiff to have a fair jury trial there. Despite this
showing of bias and prejudice the motion was denied.
Through the case of Anderson v. johnson, 1 Utah 2d
400, 268 P.2d 427 ( 1954) affirmed a change of venue,
it sets forth the rule that "all laws that have to do with
the removal of action from one local jurisdiction to
another for trial have one definite purpose, that is to
promote justice by avoiding local matters of a prejudicial
nature that might be detrimental to the rights of one
of the parties."
The plaintiff in this case is entitled to his day in
court and also to a day in court where an unbiased
jury may be had.
Though the case did not get to the jury, it was
nonetheless error not to grant the motion for a change
of venue. In a subsequent trial the plaintiff should be
afforded a trial in a county where an unbiased jury may
be assured.
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiff submits that the record before this
court shows that the trial court abused its sound discretion in failing to grant plaintiff's motion for a continuance and in failing to grant plaintiff's motion for
a change of venue.
Plaintiff prays that this court reverse or vacate the
judgment of the lower court and remand this case for
a trial on the merits in a county free from bias and
prejudice, and in any event that it be reversed for a
trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
Gardner & Burns
25 East Lincoln Avenue
Cedar City, Utah
Nathan Goller
9171 Wilshire Blvd.
Beverly Hills, California

Attorneys for the Appellant
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